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The influence of government size on economic growth and life 
satisfaction. A case study from Japan. 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract. This paper uses Japanese prefecture-level data for the years 1979 and 1996 to examine 
how the relationship between government size and life satisfaction changes. The major findings are: 
(1) Government size has a detrimental effect on life satisfaction when government size impedes 
economic growth in the economic developing stage. However, this effect clearly decreases when 
government size is not associated with economic growth in the developed stage. (2) Particularized 
trust is positively associated with life satisfaction of females but not with that of males. Such a 
tendency becomes more remarkable in the developed stage.  These results are unchanged when the 
endogeneity bias caused by local government size and proxies of trust are controlled for.   
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1. Introduction 
 
How and why do people become happy? Undoubtedly, this been among the most important 
questions for policy makers (Layard, 2006), and since the early 1990s, researchers in the fields of 
economics and political economics have begun to pay it attention (Frey & Stutzer, 2002).  Increasing 
numbers of works attempting to analyze individual subjective well-being have considered not only 
economic factors such as income level and consumption but also various other ones such as formal 
and informal institutions1. It is widely acknowledged that the government plays an important role in 
society. Therefore, in respect to public choice, exploring government size is now thought to be a major 
issue and empirical works have investigated its impact on subjective-well being2. There is a view 
based on public choice theory that government size becomes larger than optimal to benefit a 
country‟s citizens because governments do not usually act as „benevolent dictators‟3. Bjørnskov et al. 
(2007) presents evidence that government size can negatively affect on life satisfaction. However, 
this finding is deduced from limited cross country data, and the dynamic aspect has not been taken 
into account. It is worthwhile examining whether the negative association between government size 
and well-being is stable over time because dynamic factors influence on life satisfaction (Bjørnskov et 
al., 2008d).  
It is conjectured that resources are allocated less efficiently by larger governments, leading to 
lower economic growth. Several reports support this view (e.g., Landau, 1985; Peden & Bradley, 
1989; Dar & AmirKhalkhalim 2002; Fölster & Herekson, 2002). On the other hand, some researchers 
find no discernable relationship between government size and economic growth (e.g., Ram, 1986; 
Bairam, 1990; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Mendoza et al., 1997)4. Guseh (1997) pays attention to the 
institutional features of countries and points out that government size has a detrimental effect on 
economic growth in developing countries, but that this negative effect is clearly mitigated by 
democracy5. As shown by Acemoglu et al. (2008), per capita income is positively related to the rise of 
democracy. This leads me to presume that a matured democracy viewed as an outcome of the rise in 
per capita income decreases government inefficiency, leading to an alleviation of the negative 
                                                   
1 For instance, informal institutions such as social trust or social capital (e.g., Bjørnskov, 2003; 
Helliwell, 2006) and formal institution (Frey & Stutzer, 2000; Bjørnskov et al., 2008c) are regarded 
as critical in determining subjective well-being. 
2 Bureaucratic rent and decentralization are considered to be determinants of life satisfaction 
(Luechinger et al., 2006; Bjørnskov et al., 2008 b) 
3 Various reports attempt to theoretically investigate the optimal size of government by considering 
the relationships among benefits, democratic control and government size (Lee 1989; Folsom & 
Gonzalez 1999). It might be important to consider democratic control in prefectures to establish any 
correlations between democratic control and government size on one hand and between democratic 
control and life satisfaction on the other. In an empirical work, this approach is, however, 
problematic since it is difficult to measure the degree of democratic control over a government. 
4 There is argument that the relationship between government size and growth is non-linear (e.g., 
Barro 1997; Grossman, 1988; Chen & Lee, 2005; Angelopoulos et al., 2008). 
5 The degree of democracy is thought to play a crucial role in improving economic efficiency (Feld & 
Savioz, 1997). 
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influence of government size on life satisfaction6. However, no work has attempted to examine 
whether the effect of government size on life satisfaction changes under a dynamic process of 
institutional change. 
As well as government size, it is argued that various factors such as social trust, human capital, 
and age can be considered as determinants of life satisfaction (Bjørnskov et al., 2007; Bjørnskov et al., 
2008 c; Scoppa & Ponzo 2008). The determinants of life satisfaction appear to vary between different 
periods of time, even in the same country.  This might be in part because formal and informal 
institutional changes appear to influence life styles and interpersonal relationships.  
Japan has experienced rapid economic growth, especially in the postwar period (Yamamura et al., 
2005; Yamamura & Shin, 2007). Such growth inevitably transformed traditional Japanese society 
into a modern one; this is reflected, for instance, in the rise in the social standing of women. It seems 
that in the wake of changes in circumstance, the generational and gender gaps in the way life is 
perceived have widened7. Thus Japan is a country suitable for comparing different circumstances 
across generations and genders. Survey data on Japan, from 1979 and 1996 cover life satisfaction 
across 3 age groups and both genders.  This data allows me to compare the determinants of life 
satisfaction between different points in time and across generations and genders. The present paper 
uses this data to assess the effects of government size and other socio-economic factors on life 
satisfaction. It also looks at how these effects vary under the influence of societal structural changes. 
Compared with reports that use cross country data (e.g., Bjørnskov, 2006; Bjørnskov et al 2007; 
Bjørnskov et al 2008a; Bjørnskov et al 2008b), another advantage of studying a cross-section of a 
single country is that factors such as national politics, culture, history, and language are the same 
across jurisdictions. Hence, any bias caused by not controlling for these factors is attenuated. 
Arguments based on cross country study can thus be more precisely examined in this paper. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Features of Japanese society and changes in 
life satisfaction are briefly reviewed in Section 2. Section 3 explains the data and methods used.  
Section 4 discusses the results of the estimations. The final section offers concluding observations. 
 
2. Review of modern Japanese society and life satisfaction 
 
2.1. Local interest groups and public sector  
In Japan, the central government distributes local transfer and allocation taxes and national 
government disbursements to local governments. Hence, representatives of the Diet appeal to the 
cabinet or bureaucrats to distribute more in the region they represent (Doi & Ihori 2002). Such 
distributions are critical elements for these representatives to be reelected. This is why that 
                                                   
6 It is not observed that the degree of democracy alleviates the detrimental influence caused by 
government size in cross country analysis (Bjørnskov et al., 2007).  
7 Empirical research concerning trust in Japan presents evidence that there is a distinct difference 
in the degree of trust between genders (Yamamura, 2008a), and across generations (Yamamura, 2008 
b). 
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“Allocation of region-specific privileges in the form of subsidies or public works from the central 
government has been mainly determined by the political factors” (Doi & Ihori 2002, p.493). About 
one-third of local government revenues consist of local transfer and allocation taxes and national 
government disbursements (Doi & Ihori 2009, p.162). Heavy financial support provided by the 
central to local government is considered the main reason why there are variations in local 
government size8. The degree of democratic control depends on whether local citizens can discourage 
local interest groups and politicians from diverting local government away from just serving 
themselves at the expense of the rest of society. Lobbying activity by local interest groups living in 
rural and agricultural areas leads to numerous deficits (Doi & Ihori 2002; Doi & Ihori 2009, Ch.7)9. 
Variations in government inefficiencies among prefectures are considered to be the result of 
differences in democratic control. 
 
2.2. Government size and life satisfaction.  
 
As is more fully explained in section 3, the rate of people who feel satisfied with life is used as a 
measure of life satisfaction index. Data is available separately for males and females across 3 
generations at the prefecture level. Change in life satisfaction is exhibited in Table 1 (a); it shows 
that life satisfaction significantly increases from 1979 to 1996, and that the degree of increase for 
females is consistently higher than that for males.  
Government size is measured by the total share of government expenditure in prefectural income 
and is presented in table 1 (b).10 From this data it can be seen that government size increased 
slightly, despite the difference between 1979 and 1996 being statistically insignificant11. This shows 
                                                   
8 About 5 % of GDP is allocated to financial support for local governments. According to Doi & Ihori 
(2002), people and firms in urban regions, which hold about 60 % of the population of Japan, pay 
about 75 % of national taxes in each year. However, they receive fewer grants than those in the rural 
regions.  
9 „Agricultural-related public capital, fishing ports, flood control, and forest conservation have been 
over funded as a result of the lobbying activities of local-interest groups‟ (Doi & Ihori 2009, p.181). 
10 Prefectural GDP cannot be obtained in 1979 and so prefectural income is used instead. There are 
various measures of government size such as the government share of consumption in GDP 
(Bjørnskov et al., 2007), total tax share in GDP (Fölster & Herekson, 2001), total government share 
in GDP (Grossman, 1988; Fölster & Herekson, 2001). Chen and Lee (2005) used three measures; 
share of total government expenditure in GDP, government investment expenditure in GDP and 
government consumption expenditure in GDP. It should be noted that the way of measuring 
government size is thought to influence estimation results when the relationship between 
government size and economic growth is examined (Landau, 1985). Nevertheless, in this paper, the 
main focus falls on an assessment of the effect of government size on life satisfaction, which is not 
explained by rigorous growth theory. Hence, in this paper, I use total expenditure comprised of 
various types of expenditure at a prefectural level.   
11 The main areas of government expenditure at the prefectural level are education, public works 
and public welfare. According to Doi & Ihori(2009, Ch.7), during the period 1979-1996, education 
showed a decreasing trend, reflecting smaller numbers of students compared to earlier years, a 
result of the declining birth rate. By contrast, public welfare showed an increasing trend, indicating 
larger number of older residents.  
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that the rise in life satisfaction seems to be associated with an increase in government size, which 
does not correspond to the conjecture derived from public choice theory. The level of real per capita 
income in 1996 is higher than that in 1979, whereas the 5 years growth rate during 1996-2001 is 
nearly 0, distinctly lower than that for 1979-198412. This implies that the end of the 1970s can be 
characterized as a low income and growth stage, and the mid-1990s as a high income and steady 
growth period13. In this paper, 1979 and 1996 are defined as developing and developed stages, 
respectively. 
Although there appears to be a positive relationship between income level and life satisfaction in 
Table 1, most existing reports provide no evidence that income level is positively associated with life 
satisfaction (Frey & Stutzer, 2002). If an increase in income leads to a rise in individual‟s income 
aspirations (Stutzer, 2004), there might be another channel through which income influences life 
satisfaction. Thus channel, if it exists, has not been taken into account in the existing literature. I 
aim to shed light on an indirect effect of income increase on life satisfaction, rather than a direct one. 
It seems plausible that a democracy tends to be a mature one when income levels reach those of 
developed countries (Acemoglu et al., 2008). If this holds true, it would be worthwhile considering 
how a matured democracy resulting from an income increase is related to life satisfaction. For 
instance, a possible channel can be considered as follows, “stricter democratic control might restrain 
bureaucrats‟ deleterious impact, lead to efficiency gains, and increase people‟s happiness” (Bjørnskov 
et al., 2007, pp.270-271).   
A cursory examination of Figure 1 shows a slightly negative relationship between government size 
and life satisfaction, in both 1979 and 1996, which is in line with public choice theory. From Figure 2 
(a), government size is negatively related with economic growth. For a closer examination, I compare 
its relationship in 1979 with that in 1996. Figure 2 (b) demonstrates a negative relationship in 1979 
whereas Figure 2 (c) exhibits a slightly positive one in 1996. For a closer examination, simple 
regression estimations are conducted and their results presented in Table A1, in the APPENDIX. 
Definitions of the independent variables used in Table A1 are shown in Table 3. I see from Table A1 
that signs of government size are negative and positive, in 1979 and 1996, respectively, and are 
statistically significant. It follows from this that government size has a negative effect on the growth 
rate in 1979, whereas it has a positive effect on growth in 1996. This result is unchanged when other 
variables are included as independent variables. That observed in Figure 1 and Table A1 leads me to 
argue that government size impeded economic efficiency in 1979 but not in 1996. Such an 
                                                   
12 This paper looks at the efficiency of government in 1979 and 1996, since people's aspirations 
appear to change over time (Easterlin, 1995); therefore, the efficiency at a different point in time has 
less impact on life satisfaction than the present efficiency. Previous works have focused on the 
growth rate between past and current years and assessed its influence on life satisfaction (DiTella et 
al., 2003). The growth rate between past and current years reflects past efficiency, rather than 
current efficiency since economic growth can be considered as an outcome of efficient resource 
allocation. For this reason, I look at economic growth between current and subsequent years. 
13 It should be noted that Japan experienced miraculous economic growth during the 1950s and 
1960s (Hayami, 2001). Therefore, the high growth period in Japan is generally considered to be the 
two decades prior to 1970s.  
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improvement of the government size effect on growth is reflected in the fact that the public sector of 
Japan was more efficient than those of other industrialized countries in 2000 (Afonso et al., 2005).  
The supply of public goods is determined through a political process, leading their supply to be 
different from the optimum level in terms of economics. It is widely acknowledged that bureaucrats 
in the government sector have an incentive to maximize their budget (Niskanen 1971). The absence 
of profit incentive induces government organizations to be less efficient (Buchanan & Wagner, 1977). 
As a consequence, a government tends to become oversized and produce an oversupply of 
unnecessary public goods. The cost for the supply of public goods is financed through taxation14. 
People are thus likely to criticize government policy when the cost of public goods outweighs their 
benefit. Nevertheless, a government has abundant information, which ordinary people encounter 
difficulty in accessing. As a result of the information asymmetry, “government can easily manipulate 
information to inflate the value of the public goods they want to supply” (Hayami 2001, p.227). Such 
manipulation is thought to be easier in the economic developing stage, since the average education 
level of the population is lower and the mass media is not sufficiently developed. As shown in Table 1 
(b), the human capital index of 1996 is significantly larger than that of 1979, suggesting that people 
become more educated in the process of economic development. It also seems appropriate to point out 
that the emergence of Windows 95 led people to have easier access various information through the 
internet. Thanks to such a change of circumstances accompanied by economic development, 
information asymmetry between government and ordinary people decreases. Thus, it becomes more 
difficult for the government to manipulate information. Under these conditions, democracy functions 
well, which seems to be reflected in governmental policy. As a consequence, budget allocations among 
various public goods become more efficient, promoting growth. This might be why the detrimental 
effect of government size on efficiency disappears in the process of economic development. These 
considerations lead me to advance the Hypothesis15: 
Hypothesis: Government size is negatively related with life satisfaction in the developing stage 
when government size causes inefficiency. Subsequently, negative relationships between 
government size and life satisfaction disappear in the developed stage when government size does 
not cause inefficiency.   
 
2.3. Difference between male and female  
I now look more closely at life satisfaction in Japan. Life satisfaction is categorized into genders 
and generations in 1979 and 1996, as set out in Table 2. From Table 2, I found it interesting that the 
degree of life satisfaction for the 16-40 year old generation is lower than for other generations for 
                                                   
14 In Japan, items subject to the local taxes, and the tax rates, are specified in the Local Tax Law. 
This is a national law; local governments have nearly no authority to set local tax rates or impose 
local taxes (Doi & Ihori 2009, p. 157). 
15 The argument presented in this paper is suitable not only at an international level but also a 
prefectural one. This is because variation of government size and life satisfaction, and growth rates 
among prefecture are sufficiently large as seen in Figures 1 and 2. 
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both genders in 1979, whereas that of the 16-40 year old generation becomes higher than the others 
in 1996. World War II finished 51 years before 1996; thus the 16-40 generation in 1996 can be 
considered as the only generation of people born in the post-World War II period among those 
generations in Table 2. This generation was educated in a democratic environment and grew up with 
the growth of the Japanese economy16. The circumstances in which Japanese people lives changed 
were partly under the guidance of international society, and partly because of strong citizen 
empowerment during the postwar period. For instance, Japan ratified the United Nation‟s 
“Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women” in 197917. What is 
more, the Equal Employment Opportunity Law for Men and Women was promulgated in 1985. It 
was partially amended in 1997 and came into force in 199918. Women thus gained in social standing 
and had a larger influence on the social lives of Japanese in the 1990s than in the 1970s. This seems 
to lead to a gender difference in life satisfaction19. The postwar generation‟s way of thinking and life 
style has been influenced by their education and are thus congruent to the matured democracy 
circumstances of Japan in the 1990s. This might be one of reasons why the postwar generation tends 
to be more satisfied with life than other generations in the developed stage. 
Gender gaps in respect to view points about political issues are increasingly observed (Goldin, 
1990). For instance, it has been found that females are more likely than males to consider growth in 
social welfare spending important (Funk & Athmann, 2008) and to support left-wing policies 
(Edlund & Pande, 2002). Past reports acknowledge that women's suffrage has led to an increase in 
the size of government and the allocation of public spending (e.g., Abrams & Settle, 1998; Aidt & 
Dallal, 2008; Lott & Kenny, 1999; Miller, 2008). In Japan, employment conditions remain different 
between males and females, although female‟s social standing has increased and females are more 
likely to participate in the labor market than in earlier years20. If females experience substantially 
lower incomes when there is a disturbed marital situation, it is rational that they will support larger 
government (Abrams & Settle, 1998). “For government spending, women are more inclined to 
support spending on social insurance and the public provision of private goods…as they are more 
exposed to economic hardship than men in cases of marital breakdown or widowhood” (Aidt & Dallal, 
2008, p.393). Hence, women prefer larger government because they benefit from the services 
                                                   
16 Pre-war Japanese education emphasized an emperor-centered historiography based on state 
Shintoism, which portrayed Japan as a divine country under the unbroken rule of the imperial 
family. Prewar education was radically different to that under the democracy introduced in the post 
war period.  
17 See http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/. 
18 http://www.cc.matsuyama-u.ac.jp/~tamura/kintouhou.htm (in Japanese). 
19 Recently, difference in life satisfaction between genders has drawn the attention of researchers 
(Booth & van Ours, 2009). 
20 According to Kawaguchi (2007), in 1995 in Japan, males‟ average hourly wage was 2960 Yen, 
while for females‟ it was 1760. The average monthly earnings (including bonus payments) of wage 
earners and salaried employees in the nonagricultural sector was 496,000 yen for men and 252,800 
for women. Whereas in 1995, hours of work per week were 38.7 for men and 33.2 for women. 
Assuming there are 4.33 weeks in a month, the hourly rate of pay was 2960 yen for men and 1760 for 
women.  
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provided. This leads me to expect that the negative effect of government inefficiency on life 
satisfaction is smaller for females than for males. Therefore, as noted later, estimations are 
conducted by splitting samples into male and female to examine this gender difference.  
 
3. Data and method 
 
3.1. Data  
    Table 3 includes the definitions of variables and the means for data analyzed from 1979 and 
1996. The life satisfaction and trust data used here are from surveys were carried by the Japan 
Broadcasting Corporation (Nihon Hoso Kyokai) in 1979 and 1996, Japan Broadcasting Corporation 
(1979, 1996). Respondents were asked, “Do you feel satisfaction with your life?”. There were four 
choices; “yes”, “More yes than no”, “no”, “No response”.  Male and female respondents were recorded 
separately, at the prefecture level.  Therefore, using this data I can calculate the rate of respondents 
who responded positively as “yes” and “I would rather say yes”.  I use this rate as the measure of 
satisfaction. There were two questions related to trust; (1) “Are there many persons whom you can 
trust among your neighbors?”, (2) “Are there many persons whom you can trust among your 
relatives?”. The rates of respondents who said “yes” to each question are used as the measure of trust.  
As discussed later, two kinds of proxies for trust are used to assess the different features of trust on 
life satisfaction.  
 Per capita real incomes and population are derived from Index Publishing (2006). The Gini 
coefficients of income in 1979 and 1994 are from the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications21.  The human capital index is taken from the Hi-Stat data base22.  
Other variables are from Asahi Shimbun (2004).   
 
3.2.  Methods 
 
  In line with the discussion above, the estimated function of trust takes the following form: 
Ln(SATISFY) itsu= 0 + 1 Ln(GOVSCAL) it + 2Ln(NETRUST)itsu + 3Ln(RETRUST)itsu + 
4Ln(INCOM)it +5Ln(POP)it + 6Ln(GINI)it + 7Ln(HC)it +8Age1640s+9Age4160s 
+9Femaleu+10Year_1979t  
+εitsu,  
 
where SATISFY represents the rate of trust in prefecture i, for year t, generation s and gender u.  
‟s represents the regression parameters. εitsu represents the error term.   
The structure of the data covers two years, 1979 and 1996, and is for 47 prefectures. Generation 
                                                   
21 Gini data at the prefecture level are obtained every five years; as 1996 data is not available, I used 
1994 data. 
22 Data is available at http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/~fukao/japanese/data/fuken2000/pfactor.xls. This 
prefecture-level panel data base was constructed by Fukao and Yue (2000).  
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dummies are included to capture the generational effects. Y1640 and Y4160 stand for the 16-40 and 
41-60 generations, respectively. The default generation is the generation over 60 years old. Female 
and Year_1979 are dummy variables aiming to control for gender and year effects, respectively. To 
make interpretation easier, the dependent variable and all independent variables, with the exception 
of dummy variables, take log forms. Therefore, their coefficient, , means the elasticity, which allows 
me to directly compare the degree of impact of each variable.  
Since causality between satisfaction and government size is not clear, the endogenous problem 
must be addressed. Satisfied people appear to be lenient in their evaluation of government 
performance, resulting in excessive government expenditure. That is to say, life satisfaction 
seemingly influences government size; thus Bjørnskov et al. (2007) attempt to control for the 
endogeneity of government size. Furthermore, satisfied people are also likely to trust others, 
resulting in an endogenous bias. Inevitably, it is necessary to control for endogenous bias not only 
from government size but also from trust. GMM estimation allows me to generalize the covariance 
structure of ε and therefore the estimation result is valid even if ε is heteroscedastic (Greene 1997, 
pp. 742-744).  To alleviate these potential endogenous problems and heteroscedasticity, GMM 2SLS 
estimation was employed.  
  The effects of each variable on life satisfaction are discussed later in this section. The hypothesis 
raised in the previous section leads me to expect the coefficient sign of GOVSCAL to be negative, 
while its absolute value for 1996 becomes smaller than that of 1979. For the purpose of examining 
the robustness of the estimation results, an alternative specification model, which included the 
interaction term of GOVSCAL and Year_1979, was also conducted. This cross term would become 
negative if the result of the alternative specification is consistent with the argument above.   
Trust is considered to carry the advantage that transaction costs are reduced in a long-term 
transaction network based on trust; something that can be seen in the subcontract system in the 
Japanese manufacturing industry (Asanuma, 1989). I thus generally predict the signs of trust to be 
positive, as in some studies (Bjørnskov, 2003; Helliwell, 2003, 2006; Bjørnskov et al., 2007). 
Interpersonal trust can be roughly divided into generalized and particularized trust (Uslaner, 2002; 
Bjørnskov 2006). “The central idea distinguishing generalized from particularized trust is how 
inclusive your moral community is.” (Uslaner, 2002: 26-27).  People with generalized trust have 
positive views toward both their own in-group and out-groups, whereas those with particularized 
trust have positive views of their own in-group but a negative attitude toward groups to which they 
do not belong. Trust in relatives can convincingly be taken as particularized trust because a blood 
relationship is relatively stable and closed to others 23 . As pointed out by Uslaner (2002), 
neighborhood trust shares the characteristics not only of particularized trust but also of generalized 
trust. A lack of the population mobility induces neighbors to repeatedly interact with each other so 
that interpersonal trust is formed among them through long term relationships. This can be 
                                                   
23 Although other people can become relatives through marriage, this effect seems to be relatively 
small. 
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regarded as particularized trust. On the other hand, assuming that there is much mobility in the 
population of a community, strangers are more apt to become neighbors. In such a situation, trust 
formed among neighbors can be taken as generalized trust. These differences in characteristics 
between RETRUST and NETRUST might lead to different outcomes.  
Economic factors are captured by incorporating INCOM, POP and GINI as independent variables. 
Above all, INCOM is included to empirically test the presumption derived from the traditional 
economic theory that individuals gain satisfaction from income. It is known that people encounter 
difficulties in making a success of collective action, although it plays a critical role in increasing 
benefits for society (Olson, 1965). A previous case study of Japan found that income inequality 
hampers collective action (Yamamura, 2008c). As well, income inequality is considered to harm 
health status (Kawachi et al., 1997). I thus predict that the sign of GINI becomes negative.  
It is acknowledged that human capital increases income (Becker, 1964). If this holds true, human 
capital will improve life satisfaction. As suggested above, however, income level is already controlled 
for. Accordingly, I should interpret HC to capture the impact of human capital on life satisfaction 
through other channels. For instance, under the same constraint, more educated individuals seem to 
consume goods more efficiently because they can more easily access useful information. This is why 
the anticipated sign of HC is positive.   
  Besides the variables mentioned above, other factors seem to influence life satisfaction; for 
instance, individual characteristics such as marital status and membership in certain groups, 
particularly religious ones24. Circumstances such as the crime rate are also thought to affect life 
satisfaction. It is reasonable that people who are dissatisfied with married life are likely to divorce. 
Intuitively, as a result of emotional instability, unhappy people tend to become members of certain 
groups to seek relief, or for criminal purposes. Such points lead me to argue that these variables 
result in endogenous bias when they are included in the estimation function. As mentioned earlier in 
this section, government size and trust can be considered as endogenous variables. Too many 
endogenous variables should not be included, since it is more difficult to control for bias as 
endogenous variables increase. However, some variables are added, but only when alternative 
estimations using the cross term of government size and year dummy are conducted. 
 
4. Results 
Table 4 shows the results of the OLS estimations25.   Tables 5 and 6 report the results of 
                                                   
24 One‟s personality and values seem to influence life satisfaction. The aggregated level data used in 
this research, however, do not allow me to control for these unobserved individual effects. Further 
research using individual level panel data is called for to control for these individual effects.  
25 This paper uses aggregated level data. Inevitably, there is an ecological fallacy when the results 
are interpreted. For instance, per capita income is included as an independent variable. Its can be 
considered as the averaged value of each citizen‟s income in a prefecture. Distribution of income is, 
however, unknown. If a particular prefecture is described as having higher income earners, it would 
be fallacious to conclude that each citizen of the prefecture is a high earner. Because the per capita 
income of the prefecture depends on each citizen, one very high earner and two low earners may 
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the GMM 2SLS estimations. Table 7 shows an alternative specification, which includes the 
interaction term of government size and year dummy. In Table 7, I focus on the results of the 
interaction term to mainly examine the hypothesis. Therefore, in Table 7, the results of other control 
variables are not reported to save space.  
In Tables 5 and 7, to instrument for RETRUST and NETRUST, I employ the following 
variables26; logarithms for changing residence within prefecture, immigrants from other prefectures, 
and for the number of fire fighting teams, as well as 4 region dummies27. As discussed earlier, social 
trust seems to collapse through population mobility captured by changing residence and as an 
immigrant (Yamamura 2008a). A local voluntary organization such as a fire fighting team 
generalizes trust among its members through interpersonal communication in cooperative activities 
(Yamamura, 2008b). These variables are relevant determinants of the degree of trust and are not 
directly associated with life satisfaction. In Table 6, not only RETRUST and NETRUST but also 
government size is considered as an endogenous variable. Hence, added to the instrument variables 
as above, I use a logarithm for the number of natural disasters because government spending 
increases to recover from it.  
In each table, the results for all samples are shown in Columns (1)- (3). The results of subsamples 
consisting of 1979 and 1996 years are in columns (4)-(6) and (7)-(9), respectively. Furthermore, both 
male and female samples are used in columns (1), (4), and (7) in each of the Tables. Male samples are 
in columns (2), (5), and (8) in each of the Tables. Female samples are in columns (3), (6), and (9). 
 
4.1.   OLS model. 
 
I begin by looking at the key variable, GOVESCAL. As shown in columns (1)-(3), the results 
estimated using 1979 and 1996 year samples show significant negative signs. The absolute value for 
males is 0.08, which is two times larger than that for females. If samples are restricted to the 1979 
year, they continue to indicate significant positive signs and their absolute values become larger, 
between 0.09 - 0.20. On the other hand, the results obtained for the 1996 year samples show that 
they are not statistically significant and absolute values are between 0.002 - 0.02; therefore, showing 
considerable decline although their signs are negative. These results are consistent with the 
Hypothesis presented in Section 2. Furthermore, in 1979 and 1996, the absolute values for males are 
larger than for females, which is consistent with the expectation that the negative effect of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
average out as three lower earners. To control for this problem, individual data needs to be examined. 
Thus careful attention is called for when interpreting the results presented in this paper.  
26 Table 7 shows not only results of GMM 2SLS but also those of OLS. 
27 Kanto region dummy, Chubu region dummy, Kinki region dummy, and Urban areas dummy.  The 
Kanto region is comprised of 7 prefectures; Ibaragi, Tochigi, Gunma, Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, and 
Kanagawa. The Chubu region is comprised of 9 prefectures; Niigata, Toyama, Ishikawa, Fukui, 
Yamanashi, Nagano, Gifu, Shizuoka, and Aichi. The Kinki region is comprised of 7 prefectures; Mie, 
Shiga, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo, Nara, and Wakayama. Urban areas consist of 5 prefectures; Tokyo, 
Kanagawa, Aichi, Osaka, and Hyogo. 
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government inefficiency on life satisfaction is smaller for females than for males.    
As for trust, signs of NETRUST are not stable and are statistically insignificant, which does 
not correspond to the anticipation. This might be partly because that the results of NETRUST suffer 
from endogeneity bias.  On the other hand, as expected, coefficient signs of RETRUST are mostly 
significant positive signs, with the exception of columns (5) and (8). Compared with NETRUST, 
RETRUST is more likely to be determined exogenously because a kinship relation was formed in the 
distant past. As a result of this, the results of RETRUST are less inclined to be biased. In 1979, the 
magnitude of the female coefficient is 0.24, which is approximately 5 times larger than that of the 
male one. A similar result is obtained in 1996.  
Consistent with previous research (Frey & Stutzer, 2002), signs of INCOM are not stable 
and therefore the level of income does not play a critical role in improving life satisfaction. By 
contrast, in all estimations, I found GINI to take the expected negative sign, although not 
statistically significant in 1996, which is congruent to the anticipation and to the assertion that life 
satisfaction is influenced by the income of surrounding people (Scoppa and Ponzo, 2008). Negative 
signs of HC in 1979 are not consistent with the prediction, whereas positive signs in 1996 are in line 
with it. In my interpretation, educated individuals are more inclined to have many opportunities to 
work when the market mechanism functions more effectively.  That is, a university education 
confers considerable advantages for job seeking. Abundant opportunity to work leads not only to an 
increase in income but also to a reduction of the likelihood of unemployment. Therefore, the expected 
sign of HC is positive and its absolute value is larger in 1996 than in 1979 because Japan‟s life time 
employment system has been undergoing gradual collapse and a more market orientated 
mechanism appears to be working its way into the Japanese labor market. 
It is interesting to observe that the coefficients of Age_1640 and Age_4160  exhibit negative signs, 
with the exception of Age_1640 in 1996. This implies that, compared with the over 60 years old 
generation, younger generations such as Age_1640 and Age_4160 are less likely to feel satisfied with 
life, with the exception of Age_1640 in 1996. The estimation results correspond to Table 2. The 
education obtained by the generation born post-World War II is considered to be aligned with 
democracy, much different from the education received by the previous generation. The 
circumstances of modern Japan are more influenced by democracy than before the end of World War 
II. It seems thus an appropriate argument that the relationship between postwar period education 
and modern Japanese life is complementary. As a consequence, the life satisfaction rate of the 
postwar educated generation was higher than that of the older generation in the developed stage. 
Hence, I find the extent to which human capital matches up to formal political institutions to be 
important28. Significant positive signs of Female in all estimations correspond to the results of 
DiTella et al. (2003).   
                                                   
28 Transition economies are expected to confront the same difficulties since there seems to be 
differences in education in considering the market economy between communist and post communist 
periods. It is worthwhile examining the matching problem between a communist generation and a 
modern market oriented society.  
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4.2.   2SLS model.  
 
Before turning to consider the coefficients of each variable in Tables 5 and 6, I first check the 
validity of the instrumental variable method.  An over-identification test is used to test the 
hypothesis that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated to the error term29.  As in the third row 
from the bottom, the results fail to reject the hypothesis and so all estimations pass the 
over-identification test30.  Overall, the choice of instruments is valid in all estimations and so the 
GMM 2SLS estimation is applicable.  
As shown in Tables 5 and 6, the results of GOVSCAL are unchanged from Table 4, as discussed, 
above after controlling for endogenous bias; this strongly supports the Hypothesis concerning the 
effect of government size and its difference between males and females. With respect to trust, 
NETRUST shows consistently positive signs in all estimations, and is statistically significant in 
1996.   
As for RETRUST, I found it surprising that in 1996 the male coefficient takes a negative sign 
whereas the female one takes a significant positive sign. Any difference from Table 4 might be 
because of an alleviation of endogenous bias by the GMM 2SLS method. I interpret the results of 
RETRUST as follows; compared with males, Japanese females are less inclined to take full-time jobs 
and so they don‟t set up inter-personal networks in the work place. Furthermore, market information 
is incomplete especially in the labor market, whereas long-term repeated personal interactions 
within a relative network increase the information shared between network members. Females tend 
to allocate time to interact with relatives because a woman‟s time allocated to work could be shorter 
than a man‟s. This circumstance induces females to rely on informal relative networks rather than 
market ones. For instance, matching between a child and a strange babysitter is very difficult, 
leading to a rise in the transaction cost. In Japan, when a mother raising a child cannot care for her 
child, she is inclined to rely on relatives via a non-market network rather than demand a babysitter 
through the market. In the developed stage where the market has matured, interpersonal 
relationships become relatively scarce. Accordingly, an interpersonal network becomes more valuable, 
causing trust between people to make a greater contribution to female life satisfaction than before.  
As for generation dummies, Tables 5 and 6 continue to demonstrate significant positive signs of 
Age_1640 in 1996, although other results show mixed signs. This leads me to argue that postwar 
education is robustly complementary to the circumstances of the 1990s.  
I have presented various estimated results.  Taking the results together, I concluded that 
                                                   
29 In a GMM context, when there are more moment conditions than parameters to be estimated, a 
chi-square test can be used to test the over-identifying restrictions. The test statistic is called the 
Hansen's J statistic. Therefore, I report J statistics instead of Sargan's. 
30 Despite of the validity of an instrumental variable based on the test, natural disasters are likely to 
have direct consequence on people‟s well-being. Special attention is called for when the results are 
interpreted. 
14 
 
those in this section were consistent with and supportive of the hypothesis and argument concerning 
other socio-economic determinants put forward in the preceding section. Furthermore, the changes 
in the effect of each variable can be considered to be driven by other factors. For instance, prefectures 
are at different development stages as they undergo the processes involved with structural change. 
Besides the level of per capital income, circumstances in Japan have changed remarkably between 
1970‟ and 1990‟. Japan has confronted globalization, which has resulted increased competitive 
pressure. This might lead to reducing the inefficiencies found in local governments.   
 
4.3. Robustness check. 
    Table 7 (a), (b) and (c) shows results of the OLS estimations in columns(1) and (2) and those of 
GMM 2SLS in columns(3) and (4). In columns (1) and (3), the same control variables as in Table 4 are 
incorporated. In addition to these variables, the number of crimes and the number of divorces are 
included as control variables31. Their results are, however, not reported to save space. As in the third 
row from the bottom, the results fail to reject the hypothesis and so estimations using GMM 2SLS 
pass the over-identification test. 
   Looking at Table 7 (a) shows that the interaction terms of GOVESCAL and Year_1979 yield 
significant negative signs in all estimations. This implies that government size was more negatively 
associated with life satisfaction in 1979 than in 1996, which supports the hypothesis. What is more, 
signs of the interaction term are consistently negative in Table 7 (b) and (c). Generally, absolute 
values in (b) are larger than those in (c), suggesting that difference of GOVESCAL effects between 
1979 and 1996 for males is clearly larger than that for females. What is observed in Figure 7 is 
consistent with the findings presented in Tables 4, 5, and 6; meaning that these estimation results 
are robust32. As for GOVESCAL seen in the second row, this produced significant negative signs for 
the pooled sample and for males. This indicates that government size has a detrimental effect on life 
satisfaction in the excluded year, 1996. On the other hand, it fails to be significant for females, 
despite being negative. These findings are not in line with the results in Tables 4, 5, and 6. The 
results presented in Table 7 imply that generally government size continues to decrease life 
satisfaction, although improvements in government efficiency attenuated the negative effect of 
government size, which is not inconsistent with the public choice theory. This holds for males but not 
females. Furthermore, the gender gap regarding views of government size became more obvious in 
1996 than in 1979. From a macro-economic viewpoint, Japan has experienced economic and financial 
distress since 1990, which is in sharp contrast to the economic growth seen in the previous four 
decades (Cargill, 2006). As argued in Section 2, economic hardship lead females to be more inclined 
to support social security provided by government than males. Hence, the negative effect of 
government size deduced from the public choice view is neutralized for females.    
                                                   
31 It should be noted, as argued earlier, that the numbers of crimes and divorces possibly lead to 
endogenous bias. 
32 It might be unclear whether some relationships between life satisfaction and independent 
variables can be interpreted causally. Thus careful attention is needed when interpreting data. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
That government size has a detrimental effect on the degree of life satisfaction from the view point 
of public choice theory is a plausible conclusion. However, a country transits from the developing to 
the developed stage in tandem with increases in income accompanied by institutional change. There 
appears to be a positive relationship between income and democracy; thus economic growth is 
thought to influence life satisfaction through a rise in democracy. Another issue then arises, that of 
whether the negative influence of government size on life satisfaction continues to be stable over 
time in the process of economic and institutional development. Little is known about this issue. 
Therefore, this paper used Japanese prefecture-level data for the years 1979 and 1996 to investigate 
how government size is associated with life satisfaction. The situations for each year can be roughly 
characterized as follows. Favorable economic growth was achieved although per capita income level 
was not so high in 1979, whereas per capital income reached a high level despite the low economic 
growth rate in 1996. Thus 1979 and 1996 are defined as developing and developed stages, 
respectively. 
Through a GMM 2SLS estimation, which allowed me to control for endogeneity bias, I found as 
follows: (1) Government size had a detrimental effect on life satisfaction when it impeded economic 
growth in 1979. By contrast, the negative impact of the effect of government size on life satisfaction 
decreased in 1996, when government size was not associated with economic growth. (2) 
Particularized trust is positively associated with female life satisfaction but not with male. Such a 
tendency becomes more remarkable in the developed stage.  These results do not change in the 
developed stage when I control for the endogeneity bias caused by local government size and proxies 
of trust. (3) The degree of life satisfaction of the generation born in the post-World War II period is 
remarkably higher than other generations, for both males and females.  
The findings above are consistent with those of Bjørnskov et al. (2007); that government 
effectiveness alleviates the negative effects of government size. Nonetheless, achieving a mature 
democracy seems to take a long time. I conjecture that in the mid-1990s, Japan reached a level of 
income and economic development in which democracy substantially functioned, and so Japan was 
in a matured state.  Consequently, as pointed out by Guesh (1997), stronger democracy subdues the 
negative effect of government size on economic growth.  That is, it can be argued that the 
relationship between government size and life satisfaction evolves under the influence of changes in 
circumstances. It is, however, not obvious whether the findings of this paper hold generally, since 
country specific characteristics such as historical events and institutional conditions seem to 
influence growth and life satisfaction. For instance, it can be argued that inequality of income and 
land distribution impedes economic growth (Alesina & Rodrik, 1994). The literature (Ranis, 1990; 
Wade, 1990) reports that several Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan 
experienced land reform after World War II, resulting in a reduction of land ownership inequality. As 
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a consequence, economic growth was augmented. Unlike some Asian countries, countries without the 
experience of land reform are thought to encounter difficulties promoting growth (Ranis 1990; Wade, 
1990). In the long term, such institutional differences are likely to cause differences in life 
satisfaction among countries. If the institutions impeding economic growth persist, government size 
appears to continue to be negatively associated with life satisfaction.  
In a case study of a country, it is difficult to find proxy variables to appropriately capture the 
changes of circumstance such as democracy and other formal institution influences. For instance, 
direct evidence for variations in democratic control cannot be presented even though democratic 
control is thought to have an important role. Therefore, to investigate how the results can be 
generalized, additional international comparative study is required. Further, limitations inherent in 
the data of this study, deduced from aggregated prefecture-level data, do not allow me to more closely 
and directly explore life satisfaction at the individual level. For instance, individual characteristics 
such as the degree of trust, employment and birth year are required to scrutinize the assertion as 
above (e.g., DiTella et al., 2003; Helliwell, 2003; Bjørnskov et al., 2008a; 2008b). Further research 
will be necessary to more closely investigate these factors.  
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(c) 1996 
Fig.1 Government expenditure and life satisfaction. 
Note.  Government size is a log of government expenditure over total income. Life satisfaction is a 
log of the rate of respondents who feel satisfaction with their life. 
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(c) 1996 
Fig.2 Government expenditure and growth rate of real per capita income. 
 
Note. Government size is ln(Government expenditure/ Income). The growth rates during 1979-1984 
and 1996-2001 are presented in the 1979 and 1996 columns, respectively. 
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Table 1.  Comparison between 1979 and 1996 (%) 
(a) Life satisfaction 
  1979 1996 t-value 
All sample  73.6 
 
82.9 12.7** 
Male 
 
68.9 81.4 11.4** 
Female 
 
78.3 84.5 7.9** 
 
(b) Government expenditure rate, Regional real per capita income, and Growth rate of 
real per capita income. 
  1979 1996 t-value 
Government 
expenditure (%) 
   15.7 17.0 1.06 
Real per capita income 
(Thousands yens) 
2,092 3,009 10.7** 
Growth rate (%) 15.1 -0.1 17.2** 
 
Human capital index 
 
1.02 1.04 8.24** 
 
Note. Absolute t-values are presented. ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
The growth rates during 1979-1984 and 1996-2001 are presented in the 1979 and 1996 columns, 
respectively.  
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Table 2.  Life satisfaction by generation in 1979 and 1996 (%) 
(1)  
     Male       Female 
Generation 1979 1996  1979 1996 
16-40   63.1 
 
 90.5   74.5   88.5 
41-60 
 
 63.5  72.8   75.0   78.7 
60_ 
 
79.9 80.8  85.5  86.4 
 
Note. Categories for 1979 are 16-40 years old, 41-60 years old and over 61 years old. Categories for 
1996 are 16-30 years old, 31-55 years old and over 56 years old; for comparisons these categories are, 
respectively, taken as roughly equivalent to those of 1979.  
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Table 3.  Variable definitions and basic statistics 
 
Variables Definition  Mean Standard 
deviation 
GOVSCAL Government expenditure/ Income 
(%) 
  16.3 5.61 
NETRUST 
 
Rates of respondent trusting 
neighbors (%) 
 47.4 10.1 
RETRUST Rates of respondent trusting 
relatives (%) 
 68.2   6.8 
INCOM 
 
Regional real per capita income 
(thousands of Yen). 
 2,550 616 
POP 
 
Number of population (thousands). 2,516 2,292 
GINI 
 
Gini coefficient of income 0.27 0.02 
HC 
 
Human capital index 1.04 0.03 
Age_1640 
    
Generation between 16 and 40 
years old dummy 
0.33 0.47 
Age_4160 
   
Generation between 41 and 60 
years old dummy 
0.33  0.47 
Female  
    
Female dummy 0.50 0.50 
Year_1979 
 
1979 year dummy 0.50 0.50 
Note. Values are simple averages. Data source is the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (1979; 1996), 
Asahi Shimbun (2004), Index Publishing (2006) and the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications (various years).  The definitions of generation dummy variables 
correspond to those in Table 2. 
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Table 4.  Dependent variable: rates of respondents satisfied with life. (OLS model) 
 (1)1979  
& 1996 
(2)1979 
& 1996 
MALE 
(3) 1979  
& 1996 
FEMALE 
(4)1979 
 
 
(5)1979 
MALE 
(6)1979 
FEMALE 
(7)1996 (8)1996 
MALE 
(9)1996 
FEMALE 
Ln(GOVSCAL) -0.06** 
(-3.02) 
-0.08** 
(-2.55) 
-0.04* 
(-1.93) 
-0.14** 
(-4.68) 
-0.20** 
(-4.69) 
-0.09** 
(-2.39) 
-0.01 
(-0.72) 
-0.02 
(-1.09) 
-0.002 
(-0.12) 
Ln(NETRUST) 
 
-0.01 
(-0.57) 
-0.005 
(-0.13) 
-0.009 
(-0.32) 
-0.01 
(-0.51) 
0.02 
(0.59) 
-0.06* 
(-1.94) 
0.008 
(0.31) 
0.03 
(0.92) 
0.02 
(0.60) 
Ln(RETRUST) 0.32** 
(8.47) 
0.35** 
(5.85) 
0.27** 
(7.32) 
0.14** 
(2.55) 
0.05 
(0.64) 
0.24** 
(3.66) 
0.10** 
(2.79) 
0.03 
(0.66) 
0.16** 
(4.16) 
Ln(INCOM) 
 
0.02 
(0.49) 
-0.002 
(-0.05) 
0.04 
(1.05) 
0.002 
(0.06) 
-0.05 
(-0.95) 
0.04 
(0.71) 
0.08* 
(2.01) 
0.07 
(1.34) 
0.08* 
(1.94) 
Ln(POP) 
 
-0.01* 
(-2.15) 
-0.01 
(-1.33) 
-0.01* 
(-2.02) 
-0.03** 
(-3.43) 
-0.04** 
(-2.72) 
-0.02* 
(-2.19) 
-0.009 
(-1.20) 
-0.01 
(-0.82) 
-0.008 
(-1.03) 
Ln(GINI) 
 
-0.22** 
(-3.38) 
-0.24** 
(-2.41) 
-0.19** 
(-2.76) 
-0.36** 
(-3.85) 
-0.39** 
(-3.24) 
-0.34** 
(-2.64) 
-0.04 
(-0.61) 
-0.03 
(-0.38) 
-0.04 
(-0.51) 
Ln(HC) 
 
0.02 
(0.14) 
-0.03 
(-0.10) 
0.11 
(0.56) 
-0.44* 
(-1.93) 
-0.61* 
(-1.99) 
-0.33 
(-1.13) 
0.15 
(0.85) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
0.29 
(1.48) 
Age_1640 
    
-0.04** 
(-3.74) 
-0.05** 
(-2.54) 
-0.04** 
(-3.08) 
-0.17** 
(-11.3) 
-0.21** 
(-10.2) 
-0.13** 
(-6.50) 
0.06** 
(6.28) 
0.12** 
(7.33) 
0.03** 
(2.75) 
Age_4160 
   
-0.01** 
(-12.4) 
-0.15** 
(-9.64) 
-0.09** 
(-8.67) 
-0.17** 
(-14.7) 
-0.22** 
(-12.6) 
-0.13** 
(-9.51) 
-0.08** 
(-7.81) 
-0.09** 
(-6.13) 
-0.06** 
(-5.15) 
Female  
    
0.08** 
(11.8) 
  0.13** 
(14.7) 
  0.04** 
(6.13) 
  
Year_1979 
 
-0.15** 
(-6.93) 
-0.21** 
(-6.31) 
-0.09** 
(-3.77) 
      
Constant 
   
-0.49 
(-1.55) 
-0.31 
(-0.64) 
-0.60* 
(-1.72) 
-0.70* 
(-1.82) 
-0.32 
(-0.66) 
-0.84 
(-1.59) 
-0.81** 
(-3.07) 
-0.76* 
(-2.24) 
-0.78** 
(-2.65) 
Obs 564 282 282 282 141 141 282 141 141 
Adj. R 2 0.59 0.60 0.54 0.70 0.70 0.55 0.64 0.73 0.60 
Note. Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by robust standard errors. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Year 
dummies are included, but not reported to save space. 
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Table 5   Dependent variable: rates of respondents satisfied with life (GMM 2SLS model) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by robust standard errors. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
   Both NETRUST and RETRUST are treated as endogenous variables and thus instrumented. Six instruments are the logarithm for the number of fire 
fighting teams, logarithm for changing residence within prefecture, logarithm for immigrants from other prefectures, Kanto region dummy, Chubu region 
dummy, Kinki region dummy, and Urban areas dummy. The Kanto region is comprised of 7 prefectures; Ibaragi, Tochigi, Gunma, Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, and 
Kanagawa. The Chubu region is comprised of 9 prefectures; Niigata, Toyama, Ishikawa, Fukui, Yamanashi, Nagano, Gifu, Shizuoka, and Aichi. The Kinki 
region is comprised of 7 prefectures; Mie, Shiga, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo, Nara, and Wakayama. Urban areas consist of 5 prefectures; Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, 
Osaka, and Hyogo. O-I test presents the Hansen‟s over-identification test. 
 (1)1979  
& 1996 
(2)1979 
& 1996 
MALE 
(3) 1979  
& 1996 
FEMALE 
(4)1979 
 
 
(5)1979 
MALE 
(6)1979 
FEMALE 
(7)1996 (8)1996 
MALE 
(9)1996 
FEMALE 
Ln(GOVSCAL) -0.09** 
(-2.54) 
-0.15* 
(-2.23) 
-0.04 
(-1.63) 
-0.22** 
(-3.69) 
-0.30** 
(-3.41) 
-0.12** 
(-2.37) 
-0.005 
(-0.19) 
-0.03 
(-0.94) 
0.005 
(0.22) 
Ln(NETRUST) 
 
0.68* 
(2.04) 
0.76 
(1.62) 
0.27 
(1.38) 
0.53 
(1.39) 
0.59 
(1.34) 
0.29 
(0.90) 
0.42* 
(2.28) 
0.50* 
(2.03) 
0.27* 
(2.18) 
Ln(RETRUST) 0.09 
(0.28) 
-0.46 
(-0.66) 
0.42* 
(1.81) 
0.25 
(0.55) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
0.40 
(1.04) 
0.35 
(1.50) 
-0.24 
(-0.54) 
0.57** 
(2.71) 
Ln(INCOM) 
 
0.03 
(0.64) 
-0.07 
(-0.65) 
0.07 
(1.52) 
0.03 
(0.51) 
-0.10 
(-1.16) 
0.10 
(1.26) 
0.06 
(1.06) 
0.04 
(0.54) 
0.06 
(0.92) 
Ln(POP) 
 
0.001 
(0.05) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
-0.008 
(-0.80) 
-0.03** 
(-2.33) 
-0.03 
(-1.49) 
-0.03* 
(-1.97) 
0.02 
(1.48) 
0.01 
(0.58) 
0.01 
(1.14) 
Ln(GINI) 
 
-0.17 
(-1.50) 
-0.13 
(-0.74) 
-0.23* 
(-2.27) 
-0.43** 
(-2.60) 
-0.44** 
(-2.64) 
-0.42* 
(-2.10) 
0.08 
(0.74) 
0.07 
(0.49) 
0.02 
(0.27) 
Ln(HC) 
 
1.04* 
(1.82) 
0.77 
(1.20) 
0.62 
(1.51) 
0.39 
(0.67) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.38 
(0.64) 
0.65* 
(1.70) 
0.78 
(1.48) 
0.52* 
(1.74) 
Age_1640 
    
0.18* 
(1.67) 
0.19 
(1.31) 
0.06 
(0.89) 
0.04 
(0.40) 
-0.01 
(-0.13) 
0.03 
(0.28) 
0.19** 
(3.26) 
0.29** 
(3.02) 
0.10** 
(2.77) 
Age_4160 
   
0.02 
(0.36) 
-0.01 
(-0.16) 
-0.01 
(-0.22) 
-0.40 
(-0.46) 
-0.08 
(-0.75) 
-0.05 
(-0.70) 
0.02 
(0.51) 
-0.01 
(-0.30) 
0.04 
(0.92) 
Female  
    
0.05** 
(4.04) 
  0.10** 
(6.52) 
  0.04* 
(1.66) 
  
Year_1979 
 
-0.09** 
(-2.40) 
-0.19** 
(-3.60) 
-0.07* 
(-2.19) 
      
Constant 
   
-0.50 
(-1.04) 
0.21 
(-0.25) 
-0.73* 
(-1.91) 
-0.83 
(-1.52) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-1.17* 
(-1.80) 
-0.51 
(-1.08) 
-0.47 
(-0.91) 
-0.38** 
(-0.81) 
Obs 564 282 282 282 141 141 282 141 141 
O-I test chi2  
p< 
3.17 
0.52 
3.23 
0.52 
4.57 
0.33 
5.57 
0.23 
4.01 
0.53 
5.18 
0.26 
0.20 
0.99 
0.98 
0.91 
1.97 
0.74 
Adj. R 2 0.02 -0.11 0.29 0.26 0.22 0.15 0.20 0.30 0.12 
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Table 6   Dependent variable: rates of respondents satisfied with life (GMM 2SLS model) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by the robust standard errors. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
   GOVSCAL, NETRUST and RETRUST are treated as endogenous variables and thus instrumented. Seven instruments are the logarithm for the number of 
natural disasters, logarithm for the number of fire fighting teams, logarithm for changing residence within prefecture, logarithm for immigrants from other 
prefectures, Kanto region dummy, Chubu region dummy, Kinki region dummy, and Urban areas dummy. The Kanto region is comprised of 7 prefectures; 
Ibaragi, Tochigi, Gunma, Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, and Kanagawa. The Chubu region is comprised of 9 prefectures; Niigata, Toyama, Ishikawa, Fukui, 
Yamanashi, Nagano, Gifu, Shizuoka, and Aichi. The Kinki region is comprised of 7 prefectures; Mie, Shiga, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo, Nara, and Wakayama. Urban 
areas consist of 5 prefectures; Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Osaka, and Hyogo. O-I test presents the Hansen‟s over-identification test. 
 (1)1979  
& 1996 
(2)1979 
& 1996 
MALE 
(3) 1979  
& 1996 
FEMALE 
(4)1979 
 
 
(5)1979 
MALE 
(6)1979 
FEMALE 
(7)1996 (8)1996 
MALE 
(9)1996 
FEMALE 
Ln(GOVSCAL) -0.15** 
(-2.63) 
-0.23** 
(-2.40) 
-0.08* 
(-1.66) 
-0.40** 
(-4.33) 
-0.49** 
(-3.07) 
-0.30** 
(-3.60) 
0.004 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(-0.20) 
0.03 
(1.05) 
Ln(NETRUST) 
 
0.55* 
(1.83) 
0.65* 
(1.70) 
0.19 
(1.02) 
0.29 
(1.15) 
0.57* 
(1.67) 
0.09 
(0.36) 
0.37* 
(2.27) 
0.44* 
(2.08) 
0.22* 
(2.07) 
Ln(RETRUST) 0.35 
(0.98) 
-0.05 
(-0.09) 
0.44* 
(1.96) 
0.47 
(1.17) 
0.17 
(0.33) 
0.40 
(1.09) 
0.33 
(1.13) 
-0.20 
(-0.43) 
0.46* 
(2.23) 
Ln(INCOM) 
 
-0.02 
(-0.40) 
-0.13 
(-1.19) 
0.02 
(0.48) 
-0.12 
(-1.65) 
-0.22* 
(-1.76) 
-0.09 
(-1.08) 
0.07 
(0.99) 
0.06 
(0.72) 
0.10 
(1.42) 
Ln(POP) 
 
-0.01 
(-0.81) 
-0.01 
(-0.56) 
-0.01 
(-1.31) 
-0.08** 
(-3.46) 
-0.08* 
(-2.05) 
-0.07** 
(-2.99) 
0.02 
(1.50) 
0.01 
(0.68) 
0.01* 
(1.66) 
Ln(GINI) 
 
-0.13 
(-1.28) 
-0.08 
(-0.54) 
-0.18* 
(-2.00) 
-0.27* 
(-1.74) 
-0.26 
(-1.29) 
-0.20 
(-1.10) 
0.05 
(0.53) 
0.04 
(0.27) 
-0.01 
(-0.17) 
Ln(HC) 
 
0.71 
(1.29) 
0.52 
(0.83) 
0.38 
(0.89) 
-0.44 
(-1.03) 
-0.53 
(-0.82) 
-0.53 
(-1.19) 
0.63* 
(1.74) 
0.79 
(1.51) 
0.56* 
(2.02) 
Age_1640 
    
0.15 
(1.57) 
0.16 
(1.35) 
0.04 
(0.61) 
-0.01 
(-0.20) 
-0.007 
(-0.07) 
-0.04 
(-0.58) 
0.17** 
(3.46) 
0.27** 
(3.22) 
0.09** 
(2.86) 
Age_4160 
   
0.01 
(0.20) 
-0.02 
(-0.28) 
-0.02 
(-0.54) 
-0.08 
(-1.52) 
-0.07 
(-0.88) 
-0.09* 
(-1.71) 
0.01 
(0.22) 
-0.02 
(-0.55) 
0.02 
(0.45) 
Female  
    
0.06** 
(4.67) 
  0.11** 
(8.12) 
  0.02* 
(2.03) 
  
Year_1979 
 
-0.14** 
(-3.00) 
-0.23** 
(-4.14) 
-0.09** 
(-2.32) 
      
Constant 
   
0.11 
(0.18) 
0.82 
(0.89) 
-0.33 
(-0.68) 
0.56 
(0.81) 
1.16 
(1.06) 
0.42 
(0.59) 
-0.59 
(-0.96) 
-0.68 
(-1.00) 
-0.80 
(-1.38) 
Obs 564 282 282 282 141 141 282 141 141 
O-I test chi2  
p< 
6.49 
0.26 
3.01 
0.55 
4.83 
0.29 
1.49 
0.82 
1.43 
0.83 
3.83 
0.42 
0.62 
0.96 
1.56 
0.81 
1.18 
0.88 
Adj. R 2 0.17 0.14 0.37 0.43 0.17 0.34 0.30 0.40 0.30 
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Table 7  Dependent variable: rates of respondents satisfied with life (OLS and GMM 2SLS model) 
(a) Male and female 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Male  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) Female 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by robust standard errors. * and ** denote 
significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. All estimations include constant and the same control 
variables used in Tables 4 and 5.  
# indicates that number of crimes and the number of divorces incorporated as control variables. Results of 
these variables are, however, not reported to save space. 
   Both NETRUST and RETRUST are treated as endogenous variables and thus instrumented in GMM 
2SLS estimations. The instruments used are the same as for Table 5. O-I test presents the Hansen‟s 
over-identification test. 
 
 
 (1)OLS (2)OLS # (3) GMM 
 
(4)GMM # 
Ln(GOVSCAL)* 
     Year_1979 
-0.04** 
(2.39) 
-0.06** 
(2.83) 
-0.08* 
(2.29) 
-0.12** 
(2.75) 
Ln(GOVSCAL) -0.05* 
(-2.22) 
-0.05* 
(-2.13) 
-0.06* 
(-1.85) 
-0.09** 
(-2.53) 
Year_1979 
 
-0.25** 
(-5.52) 
-0.27** 
(-4.62) 
-0.27** 
(-3.47) 
-0.39** 
(-3.73) 
Obs 564 564 564 564 
O-I test chi2  
p< 
  3.48 
0.48 
7.03 
0.13 
Adj. R 2 0.60 0.60 0.06 0.31 
 (1)OLS (2)OLS # (3) GMM 
 
(4)GMM # 
Ln(GOVSCAL)* 
     Year_1979 
-0.06* 
(-2.09) 
-0.07* 
(-2.09) 
-0.07 
(-1.55) 
-0.14** 
(-2.38) 
Ln(GOVSCAL) -0.06* 
(-1.87) 
-0.06* 
(-1.67) 
-0.13* 
(-1.81) 
-0.16* 
(-2.29) 
Year_1979 
 
-0.34** 
(-4.88) 
-0.35** 
(-3.82) 
-0.35** 
(-3.07) 
-0.54** 
(-3.53) 
Obs 282 282 282 282 
O-I test chi2  
p< 
  2.98 
0.56 
5.84 
0.21 
Adj. R 2 0.60 0.60 0.12 0.26 
 (1)OLS (2)OLS # (3) GMM 
 
(4)GMM # 
Ln(GOVSCAL)* 
     Year_1979 
-0.03 
(-1.45) 
-0.05* 
(-2.19) 
-0.05 
(-1.61) 
-0.08* 
(-1.92) 
Ln(GOVSCAL) -0.03 
(-1.36) 
-0.03 
(-1.57) 
-0.02 
(-1.02) 
-0.03 
(-1.50) 
Year_1979 
 
-0.15** 
(-3.29) 
-0.19** 
(-2.98) 
-0.17** 
(-2.56) 
-0.23* 
(-2.31) 
Obs 282 282 282 282 
O-I test chi2  
p< 
  4.82 
0.30 
7.57 
0.10 
Adj. R 2 0.54 0.56 0.33 0.44 
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APPENDIX   
Table A1. Government expenditure and growth rate of real per capita income. (OLS 
model) 
 
 (1)1979  
& 1996 
 1979 1996 
Ln(GOVSCAL) 
 
 -0.008 
(-0.34) 
 -0.10** 
(-2.45) 
 0.04* 
(1.89) 
Ln(POP) 
 
0.004 
(0.38) 
-0.01 
(-0.73) 
0.01 
(1.34) 
Ln(HC) 
 
0.15 
(0.74) 
-0.21 
(-0.72) 
0.24 
(1.04) 
Year_1979 
 
0.16** 
(13.1) 
  
Constant 
 
-0.06 
(-1.05) 
0.06 
(0.66) 
-0.04 
(-0.81) 
Obs 94 47 47 
Adj. R 2 0.76 0.15 0.03 
 
Note. Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by the robust standard errors. * 
and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
 
 
 
 
